Beijing knows this, and that’s why it has begun its own ally-recruiting effort. Xi == visited Vietnam, Cambodia and Malaysia last week, and his hosts went out of their way to give him an enthusiastic welcome. 北京知道这一点，这就是为什么它开始了自己的盟友招募工作。习==上周访问了越南、柬埔寨和马来西亚，东道主不遗余力地热情欢迎他。 Yet the fact is that resentment of China’s dominance of goods trade and manufacturing supply chains is as potent in much of Asia as it is in the US. Perhaps more potent, since job losses caused by Chinese dumping are an ongoing and severe problem. Indonesia may have lost as many as 80,000 jobs in just the textile sector last year, with more to come. 然而，事实上，对中国的商品贸易和制造业供应链主导地位的怨恨在亚洲的许多地区与美国一样强烈，也许更强烈，因为由中国倾销造成的失业是一个持续且严重的问题。印度尼西亚去年可能仅纺织行业就失去了多达 8 万个工作岗位，而且还有更多岗位将受到影响。 The real cost to developing countries of China’s trade practices goes even deeper, although it is less visible. It’s possible to count jobs that are being lost, but much harder to count the jobs that aren’t created. After years of trying to pry value chains away from Beijing’s firm grip, policymakers in emerging Asia are worried and angry. They fear the old tools of development — lower wages and industrial incentives — can’t work against a trade superpower determined to pour its resources into maintaining investment-led growth. 中国贸易实践对发展中国家造成的实际成本更深，尽管这不太明显。可以计算正在失去的工作岗位，但很难计算没有创造的工作岗位。在多年试图从北京的牢固控制中夺回价值链之后，亚洲新兴国家的政策制定者感到担忧和愤怒。他们担心，旧的发展工具——较低的工资和工业激励措施——无法对抗一个决心将资源投入到维持投资驱动型增长的贸易强国。 Some economies, such as Vietnam, have certainly prospered by integrating more closely with China. But their leaders know that comes at a cost. Nobody views it as the sort of benign relationship that could instead be built with US companies, investors, and markets. 一些经济体，如越南，通过与中国的紧密融合确实繁荣起来。但他们的领导人知道这需要付出代价。没有人认为这是一种可以与美国公司、投资者和市场建立的良好关系。 It’s entirely possible to corral such countries into a coalition meant to disrupt a China-centric trade paradigm. And, yes, differential tariffs — which penalize China more — could well be a part of that effort. 将这些国家纳入旨在打破以中国为中心的贸易模式的联盟是完全可能的。是的，差别关税——对中国施加更多惩罚的关税——可能将是这一努力的一部分。 But a few other things will need to be put in place. A big lesson of the past few years is that attitudes to decoupling from China in Asia vary widely. Some countries, India, especially, are eager to isolate Beijing as far as possible, and have gone further than most in the West to control Chinese investment and cut trade links. Others, such as Indonesia, might be willing to join in any effort to reshape supply chains that gives them a shot at industrialization, but will need an incentive that outweighs the promises and threats that Beijing could deploy. And there are yet others, such as Cambodia, that are perhaps too closely integrated with China now to be reliable partners for the US. 但还需要做其他一些事情。过去几年的一大教训是，亚洲各国对与中国脱钩的态度差异很大。一些国家，尤其是印度，渴望尽可能孤立北京，在控制中国投资和切断贸易联系方面走在了西方大多数国家的前面。其他国家，如印度尼西亚，可能愿意加入任何旨在重塑供应链的努力，但需要一种超过北京可能部署的承诺和威胁的激励措施。还有一些国家，如柬埔寨，可能由于现在与中国过于紧密的融合，无法成为可靠的美国伙伴。 Everyone in Asia already wanted to reduce China’s footprint in the manufacturing sector. Now, as markets in the West close themselves to Chinese goods, producers and policymakers here are terrified that Chinese overcapacity will flood their home markets with cheap imports. 亚洲的每个人都希望减少中国在制造业的足迹。现在，随着西方市场对中国商品关闭，这里的生产商和政策制定者担心中国的产能过剩会用廉价的进口商品淹没他们的国内市场。 These nations’ incentives aren’t perfectly aligned, however. They are in competition with each other to replace Chinese producers in specific sectors, for example. And some would also want to be the ones who “cheat” any final deal by trans-shipping Chinese goods as much as they can, or through the low-value assembly of goods prepared in factories on the mainland. 这些国家的激励措施并不完全一致。例如，它们相互竞争以取代特定领域的中国生产商。而且，一些国家还希望成为那些尽可能“作弊”任何最终协议的人，通过转运尽可能多的中国商品，或者通过在大陆工厂准备的低价值组装商品。 Something else will be needed as a glue to hold these diverse interests together. If aid and trade are both off the table, it’s unclear what the US has to offer. Trump thinks access to US consumers is enough of a carrot, but for countries locked in competition with each other and with Beijing, the gains from that trade might appear too uncertain. After all, if they are asked to cut China out of their supply chains, it could raise their costs, perhaps by too much to break into the US market. 需要其他东西作为粘合剂来将这些不同的利益结合起来。如果援助和贸易都不在桌面上，不清楚美国能提供什么。特朗普认为进入美国消费者市场已经足够作为胡萝卜，但对于与其他国家和北京竞争的国家来说，从这种贸易中获得的收益可能看起来过于不确定。毕竟，如果要求他们从供应链中排除中国，可能会增加他们的成本，可能过多以至于无法进入美国市场。 A coalition on fairer trade will need boutique strategies designed for each of these countries. Even if Bessent can somehow figure that out, he needs his boss to play along. Any partnership will require Trump’s willingness to haggle on the details, and respects these countries’ autonomy. 一个公平贸易联盟将需要为这些国家量身定制的策略。即使贝森特能设法弄清楚这一点，他还需要他的老板配合。任何伙伴关系都需要特朗普愿意就细节进行讨价还价，并尊重这些国家的自主权。 Trump has promised to negotiate with “more than 75” countries he says reached out to the US. Any such negotiation will need him to acknowledge that most of his Asian partners aren’t out to defraud the US. Such a change of heart seems unlikely: After Xi’s visit to Vietnam, the president said the meeting’s purpose was “trying to figure out, how do we screw the United States of America?” 特朗普承诺与“超过 75 个”国家进行谈判，他说他已经向美国伸出了援手。任何此类谈判都需要他承认，他的大多数亚洲合作伙伴并不是为了欺骗美国。这种改变主意似乎不太可能：习主席在访问越南后表示，这次会议的目的是“试图弄清楚，我们如何搞砸美利坚合众国？ America will only benefit from a trade coalition that excludes China, ensures the US’ domestic regulations and higher standards don’t render its producers uncompetitive, and creates new supply chains that include US workers. What Trump actually needs to achieve his ends is an inclusive, equitable, high-quality partnership with allies across the Pacific Ocean. A trans-Pacific partnership, if you will. 美国将从排除中国的贸易联盟中受益，确保美国的国内法规和更高标准不会使生产商失去竞争力，并创建包括美国工人的新供应链。特朗普实际上需要的是与太平洋彼岸的盟友建立包容性、公平性、高质量的伙伴关系。换句话说，就是一个跨太平洋伙伴关系。